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Abstract
Open source software (OSS) is a public good. A self-interested
individual would consider providing such software, if the beneﬁts he
gained from having it justiﬁed the cost of programming. Neverthe-
less each agent is tempted to free ride and wait for others to develop
the software instead. This problem is modelled as a war of attri-
tion with complete information, job signaling, repeated contribution
to the public good and uncertainty in programming. The resulting
game does not feature any delay: software will be provided swiftly, by
young, low-cost individuals who gain considerably by signaling their
programming skills; the startup (and collapse) of an OSS project dis-
plays bandwagon dynamics.
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11 Introduction
Open Source Software (OSS) is a public good supplied by voluntary private
contributions. The term OSS refers to the fact that everyone can access
and alter the program source code; it is a public good, because under the
common GNU GPL license, any additions made by one programmer/user
must be made available at no cost to all other programmers/users. Contrary
to what one might expect, there are no signs of under-provision or delays
in supply.1 Several OSS projects even capture market shares from their
commercial competitors and have a reputation for innovation and reliability.
Popular examples are Linux, which is currently estimated to run on some
18 million computers (Linux Counter (2002)), and the Apache Web Server,
which is installed on 58% (i.e. 22 million units) of reachable web servers
(Netcraft (2002)). These achievements are even more astounding, if one
takes into account the fact that millions of lines of codes have been written
and thousands of software bugs have been ﬁxed for each large OSS project,
all by individual volunteer programmers. These programmers only associate
with each other through informal communities, internet news groups and the
common interest in OSS. They dedicate their time and eﬀort free of charge,
even though they are not able to exclude others from the beneﬁts of their
work.
This paper addresses the OSS phenomenon as a game of the private pro-
vision of a public good (see also Johnson, 2001). Following on from the work
of Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984), Hendricks et al. (1988) and Bilodeau and Slivin-
ski (1996), the paper starts by developing a simple war of attrition setting,
which builds on existing results and assumptions, whilst reﬂecting OSS pecu-
liarities. For example, information on the status of projects and the abilities
(programming techniques) of other programmers is freely available within
1For an introduction to the history and success of OSS see for example Stallmann
(1999), Rosenberg (2000), Feller and Fitzgerald (2002) or Hars and Ou (2002).
2the community of OSS programmers, as the source code is open and various
OSS internet newsgroups exist (See DeBona et al. (1999)), hence we solve
the game assuming complete information. Furthermore we extend the exist-
ing literature on the private provision of public goods by explicitly modelling
some additional OSS speciﬁc characteristics. First, signaling: the providers
of the public good receive an additional payoﬀ, on top of the utility from
the public good, from being able to signal their programming abilities. This
signal creates value both through improving prospects on the job market,
Lerner and Tirole (2000) and Raymond (2000b), and enhancing reputations
within the community of programmers (see Raymond (2000a) and Diamond
and Torvalds (2001)); this signal only continues for a limited period of time
after the contribution takes place. Such signals are institutionalised in OSS
activity: the OSS license obliges its programmers/users to document all pro-
gramme changes made (including naming the author of the changes) in the
software itself. Second, the simple private-provision-of-a-public-good model
– where the OSS is a one-oﬀ discrete unit of a public good – is extended
to incorporate modular software programming; agents improve the available
OSS by creating complementary software modules, thus making repeated
contributions to the public good. This extension means that the certainty
assumption in the model has to be adapted; this acknowledges the fact that
the success of any programming eﬀort is uncertain. The individual agents do
not know a priori how many modules will actually be created at any moment
in time, but they do know how many agents are expending eﬀort on develop-
ing additional modules, and that the value of a new module increases with
the number of other software modules developed for the same OSS project.2
2More precisely, the model assumes that the functionality and applicability of any
software module depends on how many other modules are developed. For example the
improvement of an operating system developed by one agent increases the value of a newly
programmed driver by another agent, and vice versa.
3The paper derives the following results from the formal model. In a stan-
dard war-of-attrition game, where open source software is a one-oﬀ discrete
unit of public good to be developed, the software will be provided without
delay. The actual individual who provides the unit can be identiﬁed. Ceteris
paribus this individual receives a greater beneﬁt from using the OSS, gains
more from being able to signal his programming ability, has a longer time
horizon (i.e. a younger individual), is more patient, and faces lower costs for
software development. If the software development examined is modular in
nature, i.e. if agents repeatedly contribute to the public good, the war-of-
attrition feature of the game collapses. Instead, agents have to decide when
to join and exit the programmer community. Once again, software will be
provided sooner rather than later. Individuals are more likely to join the
programmer community (and will start to free ride at a later point in time),
when they receive a greater beneﬁt from the OSS, have a longer time horizon,
are more patient, have lower costs when developing software, when there is a
higher success rate in programming activity, when there is more complemen-
tarity between software modules, and when the community of programmers
is larger. A larger beneﬁt from signaling – even though it initially attracts
agents to join a OSS community – also induces agents to start to free ride at
an earlier stage, i.e. agents aim to harvest the (now larger) value of the sig-
nal. More importantly, the model establishes that the start up (and collapse)
of an OSS community of programmers displays bandwagon dynamics.3
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The following section introduces
the model and presents the assumptions used for the basic OSS phenomenon
that result in a war-of-attrition setup; it only deals with equilibria where
software development (the public good) is treated as a single discrete unit.
In section 3, the game is extended to deal with software development of
3The addition of one agent to the community of programmers immediately increases
the probability of other non-members joining.
4a modular nature, i.e. individuals can repeatedly contribute to the public
good. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a population of N individuals. Each individual j has the ability to
develop one discrete unit of OSS. Once developed it exists forever, is identical
for all individuals, and its consumption is characterised by non-rivalry and
non-excludability. Time is continuous and individuals discount the future at
the rate rj. Utility ﬂows are as follows. Without the OSS, individuals have
to use a commercial closed source software alternative and receive the utility
ﬂow vj. From the time when the OSS is introduced, all individuals receive
the ﬂow utility uj = vj + zj, where zj (zj ≥ 0 ∀ j = 1,...,N) is the ﬂow
value from the OSS being available. Individuals can produce the software at
cost Cj, which will be speciﬁed below. Cj is the present discounted value of
the net costs to the individual j who develops the OSS, i.e. it is the actual
development cost minus any gains from the signaling of programming ability
and the improved reputation within the community of programmers. Given
these speciﬁcations we can state:
Lemma 1. No individual in group m, deﬁned by Cj ≥
zj
rj for all j = 1,...,m,
would ever develop the OSS. The community of potential developers consists
of n = N − m individuals i, for which Ci <
zi
ri for all i = 1,...,n.
In other words, lemma 1 states that those individuals who face lower costs
when developing software, or who beneﬁt more from the OSS, are potential
developers of the software.
Assumption 1. Within the community n, all costs and beneﬁts are common
knowledge.
5If a simultaneous one-time choice is modelled using the strategy set
{develop,do not develop}, then this game becomes a static game of chicken,
where the winning agents are able to free ride and receive the payoﬀ
ui
ri, and
the losing agent develops the software and receives the payoﬀ
ui
ri − Ci. If no
one develops the OSS, the payoﬀ for all is
vi
ri. As usual, this type of game
features a host of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria, in which anyone
might be the actual developer of the software. Hence one cannot deduce who
will actually develop the OSS.
By allowing individuals the option of postponing their decision, such that
they can wait and see if someone else will develop the software instead, some
dynamics can be added to the game. The length of time a member of the
community n is willing to wait naturally depends on the beneﬁt he would
gain if the OSS were to exist, the costs of developing the software himself,
and his time preference. In the normal form version of this game, a pure
strategy is a time ti[0,∞), when i will develop the software if no one else
has already done so.
The following payoﬀs can be stated. If the OSS is developed by individual












The net cost of developing the software consists of a one-oﬀ develop-
ment cost ci, and a net utility ﬂow si incurred for ∆ periods. The term
si denotes the gain from being able to signal programming skills, i.e. the
signaling value, which could either accrue in a job market/wage negotiation
setting (Lerner and Tirole (2000)) or from the improved reputation and so-
cial standing within the community (Torvalds and Diamond (2001)). The










6Assuming that ∆ extends to inﬁnity, then by lemma 1 we know that
ui +si −rici > vi. Thus every individual in the community n would develop
the OSS in period 0 rather than to live without it for ever. Now, if individual
i develops the software at time t his payoﬀ is
Di(t) = Fi(t) − Ci(t) (3)
Finally, if no one ever develops the software, individual i receives the
payoﬀ Ri =
vi
ri = limt→∞Fi(t) = limt→∞Di(t).
Lemma 2. Any individual i such that ci <
si
ri will develop the OSS voluntarily
and immediately at time t = 0.
Proof is given in the appendix. In plain speech, lemma 2 states that an
individual, who gains considerably from being able to signal programming
ability, simply develops the software, rather than waiting for someone else
to provide it.4 By lemma 2, the game ends at time t = 0. A more complex
game emerges under the following assumption.
Assumption 2. ci ≥
si
ri for all i = 1,...,n.
Through assumption 2 and lemma 1, we know Fi(t) > Di(t) > Ri for all t
and the game becomes a n player continuous time war of attrition (Hendricks
et al. (1988)).
Using the existing results in Hendricks et al. (1988) and Bilodeau and
Slivinski (1996), one can characterise the following equilibria for this type of
game. For every individual i, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
in which only i will develop the OSS immediately. If no one else but i develops
the OSS, then i’s best strategy is to develop the OSS immediately, and if i
develops the OSS immediately, it is everyone’s best strategy to wait. So
4Implicitly we assume that several agents can develop the software, but that only one
unit of software is created. However, all developing agents receive their signaling payoﬀ.
7the game still permits – as is usual for this type of game – many subgame
perfect equilibria in which anyone might volunteer. As shown in Bilodeau and
Slivinski (1996), the set of subgame perfect equilibria can be radically reduced
once time horizons become ﬁnite, regardless of how distant in the future the
time limit is. Using this assumption, it is now possible to characterise fully
the individual who will actually provide the public good.
Assumption 3. All individuals i = 1,...,n have a ﬁnite time horizon, Ti.
That is, Ti marks the fact that i is a ﬁnitely lived agent, or shows the
point in time at which i moves to a diﬀerent job (where he is unable to
devote any eﬀort on open source programming), or is the point in time when































The eﬀect of a ﬁnite time horizon is that the game becomes non-
stationary. Thus from an agents perspective, there is a time ¯ t, where he
will no longer choose to become developer of OSS. Beyond that point in
time, even when the OSS is not provided, the dominant strategy is never to
develop, i.e. Di(t) < Ri;∀ t > ¯ ti. The critical time ¯ t is deﬁned by Di(¯ t) = Ri.
Lemma 3. Individual i will not develop the OSS after time






zi + si − rici

. (7)
Note that if assumption 2 is violated, then
zi+si
zi+si−rici < 1 and hence ¯ ti > Ti
holds, i.e. these individuals gain no utility from waiting. Also, if zi + si < rici
then time ¯ t is not deﬁned, which is in fact the condition of lemma 1, i.e.
8individuals that are not members of the community n. Using lemma 3 it is
possible to state (Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1996):
Proposition 1. Given a ﬁnite time horizon for every individual in the com-
munity n and assuming that for all i, j ∈ {1,...,n},i 6= j : ¯ ti 6= ¯ tj , a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium exists, in which the individual with the highest ¯ ti
volunteers at time t = 0.
Proof is given in the appendix. The intuition for this proposition is
straightforward. If an individual knows that he is the most interested in
having the OSS, and if he knows that everyone else knows this as well, then
he might as well give in right away. The unique developing individual is
characterised by the highest ¯ t. Formally,
Proposition 2. Ceteris paribus an individual who
i) would gain more from the software, zi
ii) would gain more from signaling, si
iii) has a longer time horizon, Ti (younger)
iv) has a lower discount rate, ri (more patient)
and who
v) faces lower costs for software development, ci
is more likely to provide the OSS.
Proposition 2 follows on from proposition 1 and lemma 3. In particular,
result iv – the eﬀect of a change in the discount rate – diﬀers from the
results that Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996) derive using intuitive reasoning
and indeed diﬀers from the conventional intuition behind the war of attrition,
where patience is a good strategy for winning. Formal proof of our result is
given in the appendix.
93 Modular Software: Repeated Contribution
to the OSS
In this section, the assumption that the OSS is a discrete unit of software
is relaxed. Instead it is assumed that the OSS is modular in structure, i.e.
the amount of the public good is determined by the number of contribut-
ing agents. Stock eﬀects are eliminated by assuming that agents are only
interested in new and additional advances in software, thus normalising the
utility in a no-further-modules situation. It is assumed that commercial soft-
ware has a certain exogenously given and ﬁxed growth rate, generating the
ﬂow utility ∆vj. Similarly, the ﬂow utility from progress and growth in the
OSS is denoted by Zj(∆l), where ∆l is the additional number of OSS mod-
ules developed at a certain point in time. Thus agent j’s utility becomes
uj = ∆vj + Zj(∆l) when software is modular in nature.
Programming eﬀort in OSS bears some uncertainty of success. Thus it
is assumed that the occurrence of a new, functioning OSS module follows a
Poisson distribution with the arrival rate λ, where λ represents the common
programming ability in the community. So the probability that ∆l modules
are created at a certain point in time, if n agents are involved in program-
ming is
(λn)∆l
∆l! e−λn. A speciﬁcation from the quality ladder model literature
(e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1992)) is borrowed to capture the fact that the
OSS’s applicability and functionality increase as the number of modules de-
veloped by other agents in parallel increases. In particular we postulate that
the utility ﬂow from OSS is given by Zj(∆l) = zjγ∆l, where γ > 1 measures
the resulting gain in applicability and functionality stemming from the com-
plementarity of software modules, and where zj ≥ 0 represents an agent’s
preference for OSS software over commercial software. The expected utility











The utility ﬂow stemming from OSS depends on the number of other
agents participating; this creates strategic interaction among agents. How-
ever, this is no longer a war of attrition: it is no longer possible for an indi-
vidual to wait out his opponents. Rather, agents now have the dilemma of
when or whether to join and leave the community of programmers, whereby
their additional (withdrawn) eﬀort increases (decreases) the probability of
new, functioning modules occurring. This problem can be addressed by ex-
amining the expected lifetime utility of an agent i, who is a member of the
community n. When all agents including i develop OSS modules throughout
their entire lifetime, this gives the payoﬀ
Di =






In an environment of continuous software development, the characteristics
of signaling have to change to reﬂect the fact that reputation and job signal
decay swiftly if not maintained. This could either be caused by dynamics
within the community, where only agents who actually make contributions
are part of the reputation culture, or on the job market, where, due to con-
tinuous technological progress, last season’s human capital has no value.
However at the moment in time when an agent leaves the community of pro-
grammers, he still retains his gain from signaling, without actually having to
programme. Furthermore, having stopped developing modules himself, the
agent continues to have access to the software developed by other agents, so
he still receives the full beneﬁt from the OSS, but without the cost of having
to contribute himself. So the payoﬀ for agent i, who starts to freeride at time
t, assuming that all other agents continue in the community becomes:
11Fi(t) =















Solving Fi(¯ t) = Di deﬁnes the point in time (¯ t) at which an individual
who is a member of the community – developing OSS software – will leave it
and start to free ride.
Lemma 4. Individual i will stop to contribute modules to the OSS at time







zie(γ−1)λ(n−1) − zie(γ−1)λn + ci − si

. (11)
For freeriding to actually occur during an agent’s lifetime, the following
requirement has to be introduced.
Assumption 4. zie(γ−1)λn −zie(γ−1)λ(n−1) −ci +si > risi for all i = 1,...,n.
Assumption 4 ensures that the logarithm in (11) produces a negative
number. For a very large ci the condition will be violated, implying that
such an individual is not a member of the community. Also, assumption 4
will eventually hold for a large enough n, implying that free riding will occur
in large communities.
Diﬀerentiating (11) with respect to the various parameters,5 we can char-
acterise free riding individuals.
Proposition 3. Ceteris paribus an individual will start to free ride later, i.e.
¯ t will be higher, when he
i) gains more from the open source software, zi
ii) has a longer time horizon, Ti (younger)
iii) has a lower discount rate, ri (more patient)
5The precise expressions of the derivatives are provided in a separate appendix available
from the authors upon request.
12iv) faces lower costs for software development, ci
v) is part of a community with a higher arrival rate, λ
vi) takes part in a project with larger complementarity among modules, γ
vii) is part of a larger community, n
and
viii) has a lower signaling value, si.
Proof that
∂¯ ti
∂ri < 0 and
∂¯ ti
∂si < 0 is given in the appendix. A larger signaling
value – proposition 3 viii – can induce free riding, because when the agent
leaves the community, he harvests a one-oﬀ gain by maintaining the signaling
value while not facing the costs of programming. As this gain increases, the
free riding payoﬀ also increases and the agent will thus exit the community
sooner. Furthermore an important result on the dynamics of the community
emerges from proposition 3 item vii.
Corollary 1. The exit of any agent i from the community n makes all other
n − 1 agents revise their stopping time downwards.
Thus, the collapse of an OSS project displays bandwagon dynamics. The
exit of one agent increases the probability that in the next instant another
agent will exit.
To examine the start-up of an OSS project, the incentives to join a pro-
grammer community have to be examined using the same principles. The
payoﬀ for an agent j who never develops any OSS modules himself, and when








If such an individual joins the community at time t and starts to de-
velop modules himself, whose signaling value only occurs after the agent has

















Then solving Dj(t) = Fj deﬁnes the time up to which an agent would
still want to join the community.
Lemma 5. Individual j will not join the OSS community n after time







zje(γ−1)λn − zje(γ−1)λ(n+1) + cj − sj

. (14)
Of course, time tj is only slightly less than the stopping time derived in
(11), implying that after joining, an agent will continue at least a certain
period of time before starting to free ride. Furthermore, since
∂Dj(t)
∂t < 0 we
can state:
Lemma 6. Any agent j who joins an existing OSS programming community
during his lifetime will do so as early as possible.
Finally, because (11) and (14) have identical structures, the qualities laid
out in proposition 3 are also possessed by those agents, who would still ﬁnd
it beneﬁcial to join the programming community at a later point in time. It
is important to note that the conditions in lemma 5 and lemma 6 might not
be fulﬁlled in small communities, i.e. for low n. The time up until which an
agent would consider joining the community might become negative for low
n, implying that the agent would never become a member.
It then remains to be shown which characteristics an agent, who would
actually start a OSS project from scratch, has. This type of individual fulﬁlls
tj|n=0 > 0. Plugging n = 0 into (14) and solving for the cost of programming
gives:
14Proposition 4. (Starting module) An agent j with a programming cost cj
such that cj < sj − zj + zje(γ−1)λ −
rjsj
1−e−rjTj would develop an OSS starting
module.
The requirements for this proposition are in fact more restrictive than
those in assumption 4. From proposition 4, it follows that younger agents
(higher Tj), agents who have a lower discount rate, rj, who gain more from
signaling their programming skills, sj, and who have a larger preference for
OSS, zj are more likely to start up an OSS project.
Finally, since
∂tj
∂n > 0 one can complement corollary 1:
Corollary 2. The addition of an agent j to the community n makes all other
non-member agents revise their latest joining time upwards.
Thus, the startup of an OSS project displays bandwagon dynamics as
well. A new member entering a community increases the probability that in
the next instant another agent will join.
4 Conclusion
Even though OSS is a public good, it evolves at a rapid pace, developed for
free by highly qualiﬁed, young and motivated individuals. The paper argues
that once the OSS phenomenon is understood as the private provision of a
public good, these features emerge quite naturally. This paper applies the
standard war-of-attrition model of the private provision of public goods, due
to Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996), to the OSS
phenomenon. In order to capture OSS characteristics, we include the need for
a particular software solution (Torvalds and Diamond (2001) and Raymond
(2000a)) and the value of boosting one’s reputation and job signaling (Ray-
mond (2000b) and Lerner and Tirole (2000)) into the model. Further, driven
by the observation that information within the community of programmers
15is close to costless, the model is solved under the assumption of complete
information. Assuming that only one unit of open source software is to be
developed, the software is provided sooner rather than later; the individual
who will actually provide the OSS ceteris paribus gains more from using the
software, from being able to signal programming skills, is a younger individ-
ual (i.e. longer time horizon), is more patient (i.e. lower discount rate) and
faces lower development costs. Thus, this model already yields results that
compare well with accounts of the OSS phenomenon.
Nevertheless, important features of the OSS development process and im-
portant criteria, which inﬂuence the agents’ decision to join the programmer
community, are neglected in the basic model. Therefore the model is fur-
ther extended to include modular programming; a key feature of the OSS
development process. This means that agents can repeatedly contribute to
the public good and that they make their decision under uncertainty on how
many OSS modules will be developed by other agents. Thereafter, an agent’s
expected beneﬁts and the resulting decision on whether to join or leave the
programming community both depend on the number of other agents de-
veloping OSS modules, the complementarity eﬀects between the single OSS
modules, the programming ability within the community of programmers
and the signaling value. The latter, in contrast to the basic model, now no
longer lasts for the whole life of an agent, but decays swiftly following the
exit of the agent from the community.
In addition to the results of the basic model we can, with these extensions,
show that individuals are more likely to join the programming community
(and start to free ride later), when the programming abilities in the com-
munity are better, when the complementarity between the single modules is
higher and when the number of other programmers developing OSS modules
is larger. In contrast to the basic model, the signaling value not only initially
attracts agents to join the OSS community, but also induces agents to start
16to free ride earlier, because the agents aim to harvest the beneﬁts from the
signal. Due to the impact of community size on the agents decisions, the
start up (and collapse) of an OSS project displays bandwagon dynamics.
17A Appendix
A.1 Proof of lemma 2
Proof. The condition
si
ri > ci implies Di(t) > Fi(t) for all t. Since Di(t) is
monotone and falling in t, Di(0) maximises utility.
A.2 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. 6 Relabelling individuals, the diﬀerent ¯ ti’s can be ordered ¯ tn > ¯ tn−1 >
... > ¯ t1. When the software has yet to be provided at time t ∈ (¯ tn−1,¯ tn]
agent n knows that no one else will ever develop the OSS. Since Dn(t) >
Rn(Tn)∀t(0,¯ tn) and hence also for all t ∈ (¯ tn−1,¯ tn), agent n’s subgame
perfect strategy is to develop the OSS, if any time t(¯ tn−1,¯ tn) is reached.
Similarly at any time t ∈ (¯ tn−2,¯ tn−1], agent n and n − 1 are the last feasible
candidates who could provide the software. But there is a time ˜ t < ¯ tn−1
and suﬃciently close to ¯ tn−1, such that Fn−1(¯ tn−1) > Dn−1(˜ t), and hence
n − 1, and everyone else, will prefer to wait for n to volunteer at time ¯ tn−1.
Hence, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, n will volunteer at some time
t ∈ (˜ t,¯ tn]. By backwards induction, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
has n developing the OSS at t = 0.
A.3 Proof that ∂¯ ti
∂ri < 0 when software is a single unit















which, given lemma 1 and assumption 2, consists of a negative and a positive
term. Following proposition 2, we have to show that
∂¯ ti
∂ri < 0. In manipulating
6This proof follows Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996).








zi + si − rici
− 1 (A.2)
Which is always true since a − ln(a) > 1 ∀ a > 0;a 6= 1.
A.4 Proof that ∂¯ ti
∂ri < 0 when software is modular













where a = −ci + si − zie(γ−1)λ(n−1) + zie(γ−1)λn and b = risi, and a > b > 0
holds due to assumption 4. Following proposition 3, it has to be shown that
∂¯ ti









Finally, deﬁning x = a













+ x − 1
= x − ln(x) − 1
Note that g(1) = 0 and g0(x) > 0 ∀ x > 1. Condition (A.4) is therefore
true for the relevant parameter range.
19A.5 Proof that ∂¯ ti
∂si < 0 when software is modular











where a = zie(γ−1)λ(n−1) − zie(γ−1)λn < 0;
∂¯ ti
∂si is negative for:







Solving A.6 for ci leads to:
si − a > ci (A.7)
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